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Abstract
We estimate a FAVAR with Bayesian techniques in order to investigate the im-
pact of loan supply conditions on euro area corporate investment and its financing
structure. We identify shocks to overall demand and loan supply with sign and
impact restrictions.
Although tightened financial conditions have adversely impacted corporate invest-
ment during and after the sovereign debt crisis, the resulting impediments in loan
supply, illustrated by lower loan volumes and higher spreads, have been partly al-
leviated by strengthened corporate debt issuance. We show that (1) part of the
protracted increase in debt to loan ratio since the crisis reflects bottlenecks in the
provision of bank credit and (2) the tightened loan supply has been more adverse
for small corporations with limited market access.
Overall, our analysis of macro-financial developments suggests the need for policy
actions to deepen the European corporate debt market and enhance market access
for smaller corporates.
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Non-technical Summary
The financial accelerator theory, which points at the crucial role of financial frictions
for real outcomes, has since long become a part of macroeconomic modelling capturing
the full impact of monetary policy shocks (Bernanke et al., 1999). The relevance of this
channel has been extensively supported empirically at the microeconomic level, show-
ing that real outcomes do depend on financial conditions and firms’ balance sheets.
However, at the macroeconomic level, empirical evidence is less abundant, particularly
for the euro area. In this paper, we contribute to the empirical literature on the impact
of loan supply and overall demand shocks on euro area corporate investment and its
financing.
We estimate a Factor Augmented Vector AutoRegressive model (FAVAR) with Bayesian
techniques to study the interactions between a set of macro-financial variables compris-
ing investment and a financial condition indicator. We model the financial condition
indicator as the common component of an auxiliary dataset covering the financing of
investment, financial markets, the banking sector, and monetary aggregates. We ex-
pand the typical set of variables used in macro-monetary models: we incorporate cor-
porate loans, the interbank spread, a simple ratio of market based finance and the size
spread. The latter enables us to consider the asymmetric reaction to changes in financial
conditions across the size of firms.
We find that loan supply shocks had a significant influence on both real and financial
developments in the euro area since the beginning of 2008. Their impact is especially
pronounced in the shorter run and it is estimated to have been substantial, first on ac-
tivity, investment, the size and interbank spreads. However, the impact is even more
persistent on corporate loans and the ratio of market based finance. For all the vari-
ables, the responses to loan supply shocks are found to be stronger and more persistent
than those to demand shocks.
A scenario analysis suggests that the sharp deceleration in bank lending during the
sovereign debt crisis can be associated with the increase in size spread, which pushed
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up the cost of borrowing relatively more for smaller corporates that are more dependent
on bank credit. Larger firms seem to have at least partly circumvented tightened access
to bank credits by issuing relatively more market debt, as, according to the model, part
of the protracted increase in corporate debt to loan ratio since the crisis is explained by
adverse loan supply shocks. In contrast, smaller corporations, unable to issue, faced
a stronger rise in borrowing costs. Overall, these adverse loan supply shocks and the
more restricted corporate access to external finance also caused lower investment.
Our analysis of macro-financial developments in the euro area since 2008 suggests a
strong need for policy actions to deepen the corporate debt market and to enlarge mar-
ket access for smaller corporates. As euro area jurisdictions are differently populated in
terms of small enterprises, a European policy is required to promote the conditions for
economic convergence. In this context, the ongoing work under the umbrella of capital
market 2.0 is much welcome.
3
1 Introduction
The relevance of financial frictions to explain corporate investment dynamics is ex-
tensively supported empirically by reduced-form studies at the microeconomic level.
These studies show that real outcomes do depend on financial conditions and firms’
balance sheets (e.g. Borensztein and Ye, 2018, Garcia-Posada Gomez, 2019). Sizable
adverse loan supply shocks have been shown to decrease investment expenditure (e.g.
Duchin et al., 2010; Campello et al. 2010), particularly for financially constrained or
highly indebted firms. At the macroeconomic level, empirical evidence is less devel-
oped and more recent, particularly for the euro area. It has expanded in the aftermath
of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the 2011 Sovereign Debt Crisis (SDC).
During these periods, credit conditions tightened, and the share of investment in
GDP declined to a record low level despite unprecedented monetary accommodation
(IMF, 2015). Even though euro area investment recovered thereafter, over 2014-2019,
the recovery has been broadly seen as incomplete compared both to the pre-crisis levels
and to other developed economies (ECB, 2018). Moreover, these investment develop-
ments were also concomitant to relatively strong market debt issuance in Europe (EC,
2017). In the euro area, the ratio of long-term debt from non-financial corporations to
GDP rose from 5.6% in 2007 to 10.9% in 2019, i.e. almost doubling over the period.2 Our
paper investigates both the impact of financing shocks (more specifically, loan supply
shocks) on investment and the extent to which these shocks have driven the move to-
wards more market-based finance over this period. We show evidence that part of the
increase in the share of debt financing of corporates during the period 2008-2019 results
from larger corporates getting around bottlenecks in the distribution of bank credits.
An important question at the aggregate level relates to the measurement of finan-
cial conditions, given that there is no unanimously accepted single indicator. While
many available financial indicators contain relevant information about the financial cy-
cle, each individual one is an imperfect and noisy proxy, being in turn affected by other
2The bulk of the increase happened before the implementation of the asset purchase program by the
ECB in early 2015, as the ratio reached 10.4% in 2014.
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factors. The selection of a subset of several indicators may imply that important in-
formation contained in others is missed. In a VAR-type model, which is usually low-
dimensional, the omission of important variables from the model may lead to biased
relationships (Bernanke et al., 2005, refer to a “price puzzle”). In this context, extract-
ing a factor reflecting the common component of financial indicators appears to be the
most appropriate modelling strategy. The FAVAR approach enables the full considera-
tion of the information available from a large number of endogenous financial variables
and its condensation into one single index taking into account the interactions between
them.
To answer our research question, i.e. the impact of loan supply shocks on euro
area business investment and its financing during the period 2008-2019, we estimate
a FAVAR model with Bayesian techniques. We study the interactions between a set of
macro-financial variables comprising investment and a factor, the financial condition
indicator, modelled as the common component of an auxiliary dataset comprising a
broad range of financial indicators. We then identify shocks to loan supply and overall
demand on key macro-financial series using sign restrictions implemented using the
methodology of Waggoner and Zha (2010) together with restrictions on impact imple-
mented with the methodology of Baumeister and Benati (2013). Finally, we develop
a counterfactual analysis illustrating what would have happened in the absence of ad-
verse loan supply shocks during the SDC. We thereby show the impact of these shocks
in terms of lost output and investment, enhanced corporate debt issuance and stronger
asymmetries between small and larger corporates.
We believe that our paper adds to the existing research in its field in primarily three
aspects. i) In terms of geographical focus, this paper adds to the still insufficient empir-
ical macro evidence on the role of financial conditions in the euro area, whereas most
existing research refers to the US, with a very different financial market structure. ii)
To the best of our knowledge, other papers tend to focus on the implications of finan-
cial conditions on GDP and the reaction of monetary policy. In our analysis, we focus
on the implications on corporate investment and a set of macro-financial variables sur-
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rounding its financing. iii) The incorporation of the size spread enables us to consider
the asymmetric conditions faced by smaller firms, more reliant on bank loans, while the
incorporation of debt issuance enable the consideration of larger corporates’ flexibility
to issue debt in order to circumvent tighter access to bank credit.
The remainder of the paper consists of four sections and an appendix. Section 2 pro-
vides a brief literature review and explains the rationale for estimating a FAVAR model.
Section 3 explains the methodology implemented, the data used and the identification
strategy. Section 4 presents the results: the estimated financial condition indicator, the
impulse responses of a loan supply shock and an overall demand shock, the forecast
error variance decomposition and the historical shock decomposition of the main vari-
ables. The section ends with a scenario analysis focusing on the episode of the sovereign
debt crisis. Section 5 concludes. The appendix lists the series included in the auxiliary
dataset.
2 Literature review
In the literature, a broad consensus has been reached that, beyond the cost of external
finance, financial factors such as credit supply conditions and the health of the bal-
ance sheets of corporations also affect real economic developments. This has led to the
incorporation of financial frictions into macroeconomic models. While in earlier stud-
ies financial frictions were considered as merely amplifying business cycle fluctuations
stemming from other shocks (e.g. Bernanke et al., 1999, Gertler and Karadi, 2011, San-
jani, 2014), more recent models consider financial systems as an autonomous source of
shocks (e.g. Christiano et al., 2013, Adrian et al., 2013).
Regarding the optimal empirical setting for estimating the impact of a credit supply
shock, it should be noted that both investment and financial conditions are highly en-
dogenous. They both impact and react to demand, monetary policy, fiscal policy as well
as the expectations surrounding these variables. Hence, empirical frameworks such as
structural VARs (SVARs), which tackle the endogeneity issue, appear more suited to
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investigate the impact of financial conditions on corporate capital expenditure than re-
duced forms estimations.
A number of recent papers have tried to identify credit supply shocks in a VAR
framework in order to gauge the importance of their impact on the real economy, often
using sign restrictions for shock identification. However, these studies usually consider
the impact of credit supply shocks on real GDP or unemployment, and not on invest-
ment. For instance, Hristov et al. (2012) estimate a structural VAR for the euro area
with bank loans, bank lending spread, the 3-month Euribor, and a financial conditions
index. Credit supply shocks, identified with sign restrictions, seem to have had a sig-
nificant impact on manufacturing production, lending spreads and bank loans during
past crises. Aldasoro and Unger (2017) use a BVAR with a combination of zero and sign
restrictions, to show that the impact of loan supply shocks on real GDP is strong and
rather persistent. Gambetti and Musso (2017) investigate the impact of credit supply
shocks in the euro area, US and UK, using a time-varying BVAR with sign restrictions.
The short-term impact of credit supply shocks on real GDP and inflation seems to have
increased over recent years and the shocks’ contribution was particularly strong during
the GFC. Bijsterbosch and Falagiarda (2015) show that the strong rise in cross-country
heterogeneity in the reaction to credit supply shocks possibly reflect increased financial
fragmentation in the euro area after the SDC.
VAR models have however a limitation regarding the maximum number of included
variables, which amounts to only a small fraction of the variables available to and usu-
ally monitored by investors, policy-makers and financial market participants. A ma-
jor challenge is indeed that the external finance premium is unobservable, and, more
broadly, there is no agreement on a common indicator to properly measure financial
conditions (de Graeve, 2008). This means that important economic information is ex-
cluded and that the estimations of effects based only on a few variables may generate
counter-intuitive results.3 This caveat can to some extent be overcome by the use of the
3Well-known are cases where VARs with a small number of variables sometimes lead to counter-
intuitive impulse responses such as the commonly noted price puzzle. The puzzle happens when a
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factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) method, introduced by Bernanke et al. (2005).
In order to support the identification of the credit supply shock, a measure of finan-
cial conditions is included as a factor along the other series in the VAR. Any available
individual financial indicator is only an imperfect and noisy proxy of an unobserved
financial cycle and is also driven by other factors. Nevertheless, each financial indicator
can a priori contain important information for identifying the financial cycle. In ad-
dition, the signal extracted from a larger number of indicators tends to be more stable
and less time-dependent: while some indicators are well-suited for capturing financing
developments in a particular period, they may lose importance in other periods. In this
context, extracting a factor reflecting the common component of a number of indicators
appears the dominant modelling strategy.
Some studies use large data sets of corporate bond spreads, e.g. the difference in
yields between corporate debt instruments and government securities of comparable
maturity. For example, Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) as well as Gilchrist and Mojon
(2016) construct a highly-informative bond spread based on the spread of prices of in-
dividual bonds traded in the secondary market and show that those are good predictors
of real outcomes. This approach suits the case of the US where the corporate debt mar-
ket is more developed, but it is less viable for the euro area where most of the external
financing takes place through bank loans. Dave et al (2013) examine the bank lending
channel of monetary transmission in a FAVAR, considering an alternative identifica-
tion of monetary shocks and analysing the lending response of banks at the individual
level. They find that the existence of the bank lending channel is more prevalent than
previously thought using aggregated lending data. Hosszu (2017) distills two credit
supply factors from a multitude of financial variables for Hungary. Adding these into a
time-varying FAVAR model, the author shows that a willingness-to-lend shock primar-
ily increases lending activity while a lending-capacity shock influences GDP through
country risk and monetary policy. For the euro area, Altavilla et al. (2019) construct a
contractionary monetary policy shock seems to be followed by a rise in the price level. See Bernanke et
al., 2005.
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loan supply indicator using granular bank-level data on standards applied to loans from
the Bank Lending Survey, and use it as an external instrument. Moccero et al. (2014)
build a financial conditions index, which summarises the information about the future
state of the economy from a large set of financial variables including interest rates, as-
set prices, and many other indicators related to debt securities, equities and loans. The
authors show that incorporating the index in the VAR enables to better identify credit
supply shocks for the euro area: shocks are detected earlier and are found to have larger
spillovers.
A strand of the literature on the real impact of credit supply shocks analyses the
substitution between bank and market financing in times of financial distress (i.e. mar-
ket financing being used as a spare tyre), and the extent to which this substitution can
mitigate the impact of a credit supply shock. The theoretical mechanism of substitution
is investigated for instance in De Fiore and Uhlig (2015), where the optimal financing
choices of corporates can result in a shift from bank loans to bonds. In this model, firms
have heterogeneous risks of default which can be observed only by banks, but not by
bondholders. In this context, a shock which increases the dispersion of individual de-
fault risk or decreases the relative screening efficiency of banks, induces a shift from
loans to bonds. At the same time, the impact of the shock is exacerbated for firms that
cannot substitute bank finance with bond finance, such as Small and Medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). Becker and Ivashina (2014) also demonstrate that in conditions of
decline of bank financing, corporates revert to market-based financing.
On the empirical side, Aldasoro and Unger (2017), in a BVAR setting, consider sep-
arate shocks to bank loans and market-based financing. They confirm that after a neg-
ative shock to bank loans, flows of market financing increase and mitigate the negative
impact of the shock on real GDP, but are unable to fully compensate the adverse im-
pact. Holguin and Uribe (2019) estimate a FAVAR identified with sign restrictions. The
authors find evidence of substitution between bank loans and commercial papers, i.e.
a reduction in bank loans alongside an increase in the commercial papers issuance by
firms, as a reaction to monetary policy in the US over the period 2001-2016. Altavilla
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et al. (2019) show that in response to an adverse loan supply shock, non-financial cor-
porations significantly increase their issuance of debt securities, although on impact
they reduce their use of both bank loans and securities finance. Holm-Hadulla and
Thurwachter (2021) show that the aggregate structure of corporate debt financing af-
fect the transmission of monetary policy. Bond finance dampens the overall response
of firm credit to monetary policy shocks in economies with a high initial share of bond-
relative to bank-based finance. Corporate bond markets act as a “spare tyre” in situa-
tions when bank lending contracts.
Our research question relates to the impact of bank lending supply shocks on euro
area business investment and its financing during the period 2008-2019 (covering the
Global Financial Crisis, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis). In particular, we analyse whether
the increase in the share of debt financing of corporates during the period 2008-2019 re-
sults from larger corporates getting around bottlenecks in the distribution of bank cred-
its. Aiming at identifying as many details as possible of the shock impact on the real
economy and the financial sector, we work with a relatively large-dimensional VAR and
estimate a FAVAR model with a financial factor using a one-step approach and Bayesian
techniques (Koop and Korobilis, 2009).
3 The estimated FAVAR model
The FAVAR incorporates a set ofK measurement equations linking each of the yi,i=1...K
variables included in the auxiliary dataset to F = (F1, ..., FM), the vector of M com-
mon components, and the N observed variables included in the main VAR model,
Z = (z1, ..., zN):
yi,t = λ0,i + λi.ft + γi,j.Zt + εi,t (1)
Where εi,t is i.i.d andN(0, σ2i ). The FAVAR model also comprises a set of state equa-







 + ...+ ϕ̃P .
 ft−p
Zt−p
 + ε̃ft (2)
Where εft is i.i.d and N(0, Σ̃f ), Zit is a TxN matrix containing a panel of macroeco-
nomic and financial variables, ft (or f̂t) are the factors, extracted from a dataset com-
prising the variables yi and λi are the factor loadings. The so-called auxiliary dataset is
composed of the series yt while the main dataset consists of the series Zt.
Conditional on the parameters, the factors are sampled using state space methods where
ft is the unobserved state variable (see Koop and Korobilis 2009). This is implemented
by using the Kalman filter. The parameters are then sampled conditional on the current
MCMC draw of the factors. The codes used to run the estimation draw on Koop and
Koribilis (2019), Banbura et al. (2010) and Blake and Mumtaz (2012).4
3.1 Main and auxiliary datasets
Two datasets are required to implement the FAVAR estimation. Both of them are quar-
terly over the period 1999Q1-2019Q3. We exclude from the analysis the very volatile
period of the Covid-19 pandemic that would require a specific econometric framework
to be incorporated (Lenza and Primiceri, 2020).
First, the main dataset consists of the series Zt. This dataset augments the standard
set of variables considered in monetary policy models with variables related to banks’
supply of credit and the structure of corporate liabilities. However, since we do not
aim at identifying monetary policy shocks, price indicators are not incorporated in the
model.5 The vector Z in equations 1 and 2 contains seven variables. First, we use real
non-financial corporate investment, taken from EUROSTAT integrated accounts, and
real GDP net of investment, henceforth activity. The two series are expressed in real
4We are grateful to these authors for having made their codes public.
5Deflators would be required only to distinguish between monetary policy and “pure” demand
shocks as demand indicators and monetary policy rates move identically in both cases, and only prices
would move differently, increasing in the case of a demand shock and decreasing in the case of a mone-
tary policy shock.
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terms, indexed to 100 in 2008. Besides, we incorporate the 3-month Euribor as a mea-
sure of the monetary policy rate, from Refinitiv.6 The banking sector is represented
by three variables: First, real corporate loans (MFI lending to non-financial corpora-
tions in real terms, indexed to 100 in 2008); second, the size spread, i.e. the difference
between the bank lending rate on small corporate loans and that on large corporate
loans.7 Third, we use the Euribor minus Eonia spread as a measure of tensions in the
interbank market. Finally, we also consider a measure of market debt finance, i.e. the
ratio of long-term non-financial corporate debt securities over total external financing.
This series is constructed as the ratio between the outstanding amounts of euro area
corporate debt and the sum of the same series and the outstanding amount of bank
corporate loans (all taken from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse). The series is in-
dexed to 100 in 2008. In all cases, to compute the real series, we deflate the nominal
series with the GDP deflator. The series incorporated in the main dataset are plotted in
Figure 1 over the period 2003Q1 to 2019Q3.
Second, the auxiliary dataset consists of the series yt. In the euro area, loan finance
plays a much more prominent role compared to market-based financing than in the US
(ECB, 2013). Hence, while a set of financial market price indicators may be sufficient for
the extraction of a financial condition indicator in the US (e.g. Gilchrist and Zakrajsek,
2012), for euro area countries it should include a broader set of indicators, comprising
both prices and quantities, and necessarily indicators of the banking sector. The auxil-
iary dataset comprises 40 series, reflecting both prices and quantities related to finan-
cial institutions, fixed income markets, stock markets, and foreign exchange markets (as
done for instance in Maurin, 2019, or Moccero et al. 2014). The measures characteris-
ing banks and other financial institutions comprise indicators of bank liquidity, capital
ratio, asset holdings, bank deposits and other components of monetary aggregates. Fi-
nancial market-based data include government bond spreads relative to the German
6The Euribor rate is the preferred measure of policy-related interest rates, as it is key for the transmis-
sion of monetary policy and is also a reference for the pricing of many financial products, as well as for
a broad set of interest rates.
7The series are taken from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. Small loans are loans of less than EUR
0.25 mn while large loans are of more than EUR 1 mn.
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Notes: Corp. stands for corporates. Investment, activity (GDP excluding investment), and
corporate loans are expressed in real terms. Together with the ratio of market debt finance, they
are reported in level and indexed to 100 in 2008. Euribor, Euribor-Eonia spread and size spread
are reported in basis points.
Bund at various maturities, risk spreads, measures of financial market volatility and
the price to book ratio as a proxy for the aggregate Tobin’s q. Correlations among some
financial indicators are also included. Given the openness of the euro area economy,
the nominal exchange rate of the euro and its volatility, and oil and commodity prices
are also included. Finally, the Baker et al. (2016) measure of political uncertainty is fea-
turing.8 In line with common practice in the literature, the series are also de-meaned
and standardised before being used in the model.
8The Appendix details the list of series, sources and transformations operated prior to their inclusion
in the auxiliary dataset and the computation of the common component.
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3.2 Shock identification
As with traditional VARs, the identification of the shocks is a very important step. A
Choleski decomposition is predominantly used in empirical applications. However, we
do not aim at identifying all the shocks affecting the system, but only two shocks: those
to overall demand and to bank lending supply. For these, it is difficult a priori to justify
an ordering of the variables in the system, as both shocks are likely to affect investment
simultaneously. Hence, we use sign and impact restrictions to identify them.
The imposed sign restrictions are shown in Table 1. The restrictions are imposed on
shock only, during the period when the shock materialises. Thereafter, the responses
are left unconstrained. In line with most of the literature, a positive demand shock is
defined as a shock which has a positive impact on corporate investment and activity,
and triggers a monetary policy reaction, an increase in the policy rate. The response
of corporate loans is left undetermined since improved outlook could increase the de-
mand for loans, but could also improve internal resources and enable corporations to
finance investment using relatively less external finance. Finally, demand shocks do not
change the risk assessment in the interbank market and therefore do not contempora-
neously impact the Euribor to Eonia spread. The response of financial conditions, of
the ratio of market finance and of the size spread are left undetermined a priori.
A supportive bank lending supply shock is defined as a shock which softens finan-
cial conditions, i.e. diminishes the financial condition indicator, and resembles a pos-
itive demand shock for investment, activity and the policy rate. Moreover, it narrows
the asymmetric conditions faced by small enterprises, and the size spread diminishes.
Hence, the softening of bank credit conditions benefits relatively more the more bank-
dependent and the smaller corporations are. A supportive bank lending supply shock
also reduces the interbank market spread, the Euribor to Eonia spread. The response
of the ratio of market finance is left unrestricted.
The restrictions, shown in Table 1, identify the two shocks considered. Comparing
with the literature, the identification of demand and bank lending supply shocks is
similar to that implemented by Mumtaz et al. (2018) and Gambetti and Musso (2017)
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for the variables common to the different models. The key difference between a sup-
portive bank lending supply shock and a positive demand shock lies in the response of
the spread in the interbank market: In the case of a demand shock, it does not react in-
stantaneously, while in the case of a bank supportive lending supply shock, associated
to loosened financial conditions, it narrows. Besides, there is also a difference in the
reaction of the size spread. It is not constrained a priori in the case of a demand shock
while it is expected to narrow in the case of a positive bank lending supply shock. These
identification restrictions are used for the baseline model. However, to test the robust-
ness of the results regarding the financial block, we also soften the identification: we
relax the response of investment and size spread to bank lending shocks. Figures 3 and
Figure 4 provide the comparison between the two sets of responses.
Table 1: Impact restrictions used to identify demand and bank lending supply shocks
Euribor - Fin. Real Corp. Corp. Ratio market Euribor Size
Eonia spread cond. GDP inv. loans finance spread
Bank lending supply - - + + ? - + -
Overall Demand 0 ? + + ? ? + ?
Notes: A positive demand shock is associated with an increase in activity. A positive bank lending
supply shock is associated with a loosening of financial conditions. A cell with a question mark
indicates that the response is left unrestricted. All the restrictions are imposed on impact. See
footnote figure 1 for the names of each variable.
With the minimal restrictions summarised in Table 1, the structural shocks are iden-
tified using the methodology of Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner and Zha (2010) that we
combine with a methodology to impose zero response of the interbank spread to the
demand shock on impact. First, we let Ω = P.P ′ be a Choleski decomposition of the VAR
covariance matrix Ω. Second, we draw an N × N matrix J from a N(0, 1) distribution
and compute its its Q0R0 decomposition and let Ã0 = P.Q be the contemporaneous
matrix of response of the shocks. Third, we impose a zero restriction on the instan-
taneous impact of the demand shock on the financial condition indicator by using a
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second rotation matrix, R1, (R1.R′1 = I), defined as:
R1 =

sin (ϕ) cos (ϕ)




Where I6 (06) is a 6× 6 identity (null) matrix and ϕ = tan−1(Ã1,20 /Ã
1,1
0 ) where Ã0
i,j
denotes the i-response to the j-shock and tan denotes the tangent function. Defining
the response matrix as Ã1 = Ã0.R1, one can show that the response of the first variable
to the second shock is null (see Baumeister and Benati, 2013).
Given the relatively large number of variables included in our VAR and the relatively
short sample, we shrink the parameter space of the reduced-form VAR using Bayesian
techniques. An advantage of using Bayesian methods to estimate the VAR model is that
it allows us to overcome the potential problem of underestimating persistence, which
arises when using the conditional likelihood instead of the exact likelihood. We follow
the methodology developed by Koop and Korobilis (2009). We first estimate the factor
as the principal component of the auxiliary dataset to initiate the Kalman filter. We
then estimate the Bayesian Vector Autoregressive model (BVAR) detailed in equation 2
that incorporates four lags, a trend and a constant. We use a standard natural conjugate
prior that assumes a normal distribution for the coefficients in the VAR and an inverse-
Wishart distribution for the covariance matrix. The BVAR estimation is implemented
via dummy-priors following the methodology of Banbura et al. (2010).9 The Gibbs-
sampler algorithm is used: 20000 replications are estimated and the first 1000 draws
are burned.
Impulse responses are constructed by taking a joint draw from the unrestricted
Normal-Wishart posterior for the VAR parameters as well as a random possible de-
9As shown by Blake and Mumtaz (2012), while analytically equivalent, the use of dummy observa-
tions greatly reduces the computational time as the size of the variance covariance matrix to invert is
significantly reduced. There are four hyperparameters {τ, c, δj , σj} that together generate sequences of
dummy data, which in turn imply a Normal-Inverse-Wishart prior. The first two hyperparameters con-
trol the degrees of prior tightness: τ governs the overall tightness of the prior while c determines the
tightness of the prior on the constant. In line with values often used in the literature, we set these two
hyperparameters to τ = 0.1 and c = 1.
16
composition B of the variance-covariance matrix. For each set of estimated parameter,
up to 500 draws of the rotation matrix J are taken until the response matrix A1 fulfills
the sign restrictions described in Table 1. When this happens, the draw is retained, the
impulse response functions are generated and the corresponding shocks stored.
4 Estimation results
In this section, we present a set of standard outputs enabling an assessment of the
model: the estimated financial condition indicator, the impulse responses, the forecast
error variance decomposition and the historical decomposition of the two shocks iden-
tified to the historical movements of the main variables. Finally, we develop a scenario
to illustrate the impact of the bottlenecks in banks’ distribution of credits during the
sovereign debt crisis.
4.1 The estimated financial factor
Figure 2 plots the estimated financial factor. A higher value of the factor signals a tight-
ening in financial conditions, and vice versa. The estimated factor tracks well the major
financial shocks experienced by the euro area economy over the past decade. Display-
ing two major humps, it is overall comparable to the indicator estimated by Moccero et
al. (2014) or Maurin (2019) and also correlates well with the interbank spread. First,
its value starts increasing already in 2007, at the start of the sub-prime crisis in the US,
and before the bankruptcy of Lehman brothers. The financial factor then deteriorates
abruptly throughout 2008 to reach a peak in the first quarter of 2009. From then, it de-
clines until the beginning of 2010. Then follows the sovereign debt crisis. From early
2010, concerns start to spread in several euro area sovereigns, escalating in late 2011-
beginning of 2012 when market access was suspended for several sovereigns. Following
the disbursement of financial support, Troika assistance and the OMT program set up
by the ECB, the crisis then slowly receded. Interestingly, the second hump was not as
pronounced as in the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy, as this crisis was limited
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to the euro area and, despite the area-wide slowdown, euro area economies were hit
much more asymmetrically during the sovereign debt crisis. Since 2014, the indicator
evolves in a narrow range, below the levels recorded during the two years preceding
the GFC.
Figure 2: Estimated financial factor











Notes: The Figure reports the median of the indicator. An increase portrays a tightening in
financial conditions.
4.2 Estimated response functions
Figures 3 and 4 present the impulse responses of the main variables to shocks to, re-
spectively, bank lending supply and overall demand.
4.2.1 Bank lending supply shock
As shown in Figure 3, an adverse bank lending supply shock, associated with a tight-
ened access to bank credit, has a significant impact of up to four quarters on the fi-
nancial condition index. For a 0.1 increase in the financial conditions indicator, the
Euribor to Eonia spread widens by around 3 bps on impact. The short-lived upward
effect vanishes within three quarters.10 On impact, real GDP growth declines, reaches
10As shown in Figure 2, during the Lehman crisis, the financial factor increased from around 0 to 1.2,
twelve times the magnitude of impact on shock on the financial factor. According to the estimation, bank
lending supply shocks would have explained almost half of the rise in the interbank spread recorded
during the period, 36 out of 80 bps increase.
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a low around three quarters after the shock, and the negative effect vanishes around 6
quarters after the shock. In line with what is found in reduced form estimations, the
profile of corporate investment resembles that of activity but with a magnitude twice
as strong.
The responses of the macro financial variables are much more protracted. The bank
lending supply shock reduces the Euribor rate over a period of more than 3 years, as
the confidence band crosses the zero line after about 14 quarters. Corporate loans,
while not being constrained to react in the identification, are reduced on impact. They
reach a low of around 0.8 pp. of annual growth after six quarters and the negative
impact lasts for 14 quarters. The size spread (constrained to increase) also widens by
up to 4 bps in the first year after the shock, an impact that vanishes within three years.
These patterns, in particular the fact that the reactions of the variables to the shock are
significant and, in some cases, quite protracted, are in line with the financial accelerator
theory emphasizing the role of financial intermediaries as a very important element of
the financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke et al., 1999).
Besides, following an adverse bank lending supply shock, the ratio of market finance
increases, with a median impact of up to 1.3% one year after the shock. The positive
response is mostly significant while it is not imposed a priori. In addition, the impact
is quite prolonged, remaining significant 9 quarters after the shock. This provides ev-
idence that adverse bank lending supply shocks are to some extent circumvented by
corporations by stronger debt issuance, and an increase in the share of external finance
coming from the market, as corporations substitute bank loans with market debt. This
is not possible for small enterprises without market access however. As shown by the
rise in the size spread, they face a wider increase in their bank borrowing cost, 4 bps
above that recorded by larger corporations.
This result appears to be robust to a looser identification. In figure 3, we also report
the response to a bank lending supply shock identified without restricting the responses
of investment and size spread. The results are very similar to those obtained with the
entire set of restrictions. The median response of both the ratio of market debt finance
and size spread is positive at horizon up to 2 years. It is somewhat less pronounced
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however, especially for the size spread.












































































Notes: The impulse-response-functions (IRFs) are estimated based on the VAR presented in
Equation (1). The shock is identified with sign restrictions (Table 1). The red line reports the
median of the estimated impact while the grey area reports the range of its distribution within
the 15% to 85% interval. The dotted line reports the results obtained when relaxing the responses
of investment and size spread to bank lending supply shocks. For activity, corporate loans and
investment, the responses relate to the annual growth rate, in pp, while for the other variables,
the responses relate to the level, in bps.
4.2.2 Demand shock
As shown in Figure 4, a positive demand shock leads in the short-term to an increase
in activity, corporate investment and loans. Monetary policy reacts with an instanta-
neous increase in the Euribor, lasting eight quarters. Regarding the magnitude of the
impacts, activity accelerates by 0.2 pp, and the Euribor increases by up to 15 bps. Sim-
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ilarly to the bank lending supply shock, investment reacts stronger than activity: the
increase in corporate investment is twice as strong as that in activity. Corporate loans
(unconstrained), react positively and significantly after three quarters. These reactions
resemble those to a supportive bank lending supply shock, in terms of profile and mag-
nitude; however, in the case of the demand shock no significant pattern is observed for
the size spread and the ratio of market-based finance: for both, the confidence inter-
val encompasses the zero line over the whole horizon (only the ratio of debt finance
shows a significant but brief negative impact). There is also no significant response in
the estimated financial factor. The muted response of the financial variables is to be
expected, as in the case of the demand shock the transmission goes rather through the
real economy.





































































Notes: See notes Figure 3.
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To summarise, the reactions of activity, investment and monetary policy, the usual
variables in monetary policy VARs, show differences across the two shocks in terms of
magnitude and to some extent duration. In each case, the reaction of investment mimics
that of activity but is twice as strong. The response of corporate loans is more persistent
than that of activity or investment. However, the response of the banking block differs
across the two types of shocks. In line with the imposed sign restrictions, in the case
of an adverse bank lending supply shock, financial conditions tighten, the interbank
market spread widens, the size spread increases and corporates adjust their financial
liability structure, increasing the share of external finance obtained from markets. The
latter two effects are protracted, lasting more than two years. In line with these im-
pacts, corporate loan growth (which is not restricted) also declines significantly in a
protracted way. In contrast, after a demand shock, there is a significant impact on the
real variables (although it is smaller in magnitude compared to the bank lending sup-
ply shock) while the response of the financial variables remains muted.
4.3 Shock contributions
In this subsection, we comment on the results obtained for the shock contributions to
the variance of the forecast errors and to the historical developments of the macroeco-
nomic series.
4.3.1 Forecast error variance decomposition
The contribution of the two structural shocks to the variance of the forecast error of each
main variable at short to medium-term horizons is plotted in Figure 5. At a horizon
of 1 to 10 years, the two shocks contribute to explain between one fourth and half of
the variance of the forecast errors. Lower contributions are recorded for the Euribor-
Eonia spread and the size spread, and higher values respectively for corporate loans,
the ratio of market finance and the Euribor. Over time, the contribution of the demand
shock remains relatively stable while that of the bank lending supply shock peaks one
to two years after the shock. Over the estimation period, overall bank lending supply
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shocks explain a larger part of unexpected developments than demand shocks for all
the variables, but especially for activity, corporate investment and loans, Euribor and
the ratio of market finance. For business investment, shocks to bank lending supply
shocks explain up to 30% of the variance of the unexpected component, a protracted
effect that remains almost constant from the second to the eighth year. For activity, their
median contribution to the variance of the forecast error is very similar over time, but
somewhat smaller in terms of magnitude, with a peak of around 25%. For corporate
loans and the Euribor, the opposite is true and bank lending supply shocks explain up
to 40%. Interestingly, besides corporate loans, the two shocks contribute relatively little
to explaining the other variables in the banking block, i.e. the interbank spread, the size
spread and the financial condition indicator. For the two former ones, the contributions
add-up to 25 to 30% after one year.
While estimated on the euro area economy, the model reaches conclusions very sim-
ilar in nature to those obtained in the cases of the US or UK regarding the major role of
financial shocks in explaining business cycle fluctuations over the past 15 to 20 years.
Christiano et al. (2013) find that the financial shocks associated with the financial in-
termediary sector play the largest role for the business cycle fluctuations in investment
in the US. More generally, shocks of financial origin (risk shock, equity premium shock,
external finance premium shock) play an important role for past macroeconomic fluc-
tuations, and larger than conventional demand or supply shocks (de Graeve, 2008).
4.3.2 Shock contributions to the main variables over history
Figure 7 shows the median contributions of the two shocks identified to the main vari-
ables on an annual basis, derived from the orthogonalised impulse responses and the
estimated structural shocks. For each variable, the historical evolution is also reported.
Substantial positive contributions of bank lending supply shocks to the financial in-
dicator are observed in 2008-2009, after the Lehman bankruptcy, and in 2012, at the
peak of the sovereign debt crisis. During the first period, bank lending supply shocks
explain up to two-thirds of the tightening in financial conditions reported by the indica-
tor, i.e. 0.7 pp out of an estimated rise of 1 pp. During the two periods of adverse bank
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Figure 5: Variance decomposition of the unexpected component
Financial factor

































































Notes: the y-axis reports the share of the variance explained by the shocks, between 0 and 1. The
x-axis reports the horizon in quarters.
lending supply shocks, real variables were negatively affected. From 2008 to 2012, bank
lending supply shocks reduced corporate investment by close to 7 pp and activity by 2
pp in cumulative terms. It is only from 2014 onwards that bank lending supply shocks
start to exert a moderate but positive impact on investment and activity.
Compared to real variables, the negative impact of the bank lending supply shocks
on corporate loans is lagged, starting in 2010 but lasting until 2016, dampening loan
growth by more than 0.7% each year on average. Notably, bank lending supply shocks
contributed positively by close to 2 pp to annual growth in corporate loans prior to the
onset of the financial crisis, in 2006-20008. Over the same period, they also contributed
to compressing the size spreads but their effect turned positive, up to 10 bps in 2009-
2010 and 2012-2014. The negative effect of bank lending supply shocks is even more
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protracted on Euribor compared to corporate loans, remaining negative until 2019. Fi-
nally, throughout most of the period starting with the financial crisis, bank lending
supply shocks have contributed positively to the rise in the ratio of market debt finance,
by close to 1.2 pp each year on average from 2009 to 2019, thereby contributing to the
doubling of the ratio recorded over the period (see Figure 1).
The analysis corroborates the assessment of the forecast error variance contribution:
the contribution of the overall demand shock appears less substantial than that of bank
lending supply shocks over the period. The latter have remained negative for the finan-
cial condition indicator and Euribor for most of the period since 2010.
Figure 6: Estimated shocks contribution
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Notes: The Figure reports the median of the estimated historical contributions. The contributions
are plotted as bars and reported on the left axis. The histrorical series are plotted as red ticked
lines reported on the right axis. Activity, corporate investment and corporate loans are reported
as annual rate of change, in %, while the ratio of market finance is reported as annual change, in pp.
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4.4 Scenario of neutral financing conditions
The estimated model and the two shocks identified can be used to derive a counterfac-
tual scenario, which illustrates the path of each of the VAR variables if the shocks are
instrumentalised. In this subsection, we carry out such an exercise in order to illustrate
what would have happened to corporate investment had financial conditions remained
constant at their level in the second quarter of 2010 until the first quarter of 2013 - a level
close to their historical average since 1999. As shown in Figure 7, this path removes the
escalation in financial tensions recorded during the sovereign debt crisis. After deter-
mining the sequence of bank lending supply shocks consistent with this path, we then
compute the implied trajectory of the other variables. The conditional forecast is com-
puted based on the methodology developed by Waggoner and Zha (1999) where only
the bank lending supply shock is assumed to adjust to ensure the new path for the
financial condition indicator.
The results of the counterfactual simulations are plotted in Figure 7. The tightening
in financial conditions in the wake of the SDC substantially reduced activity, corporate
investment and real corporate loans. In the beginning of 2013, when financial condi-
tions are assumed to have resumed their estimated path, activity, corporate investment
and corporate loans are respectively 3.5, 8.0 and 2.5 pp below their median level in
the counterfactual scenario, i.e. in the absence of the adverse shocks. For the two for-
mer variables, the gap narrows after 2013 and is no longer significant from mid-2015
onwards. Over the entire period, the deviations from the counterfactual path in corpo-
rate investment follow those in activity but are magnified by a factor of more than 2.
For corporate loans, the gap widens further after the beginning of 2013, by up to 15 pp
until the end of 2016, and remains significant until the end of the estimation period.
The sharper deceleration in bank loan growth observed in the historical path can
be associated with the large increase in size spread that pushed up relatively more the
cost of borrowing for smaller corporates, which are more dependent on bank credit. In
the absence of crisis, the spike in size spread between small and large loans would most
likely not have occurred. Comparing historical developments with the counterfactual
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path, the size spread appears to have widened by up to 55 bps in the beginning of
2012 due to the rise in financial tensions. It is estimated to have remained above its
counterfactual value until the beginning of 2016.
Also, in the absence of SDC, the interbank spreads would have continued to decline
from its GFC peak until the beginning of 2015. The second spike, 45 bps above its
counterfactual value in the beginning of 2012, would not have materialised. The rise in
the ratio of market debt finance would have been less pronounced. The tightening in
credit standards together with the increase in the cost of bank borrowing that occurred
during the crisis provided an incentive to corporates to issue relatively more market
debt. According to the simulations, at the end of 2019, the ratio of market finance is 40
pp above what its value would have been in the absence of a crisis. Instead of increasing
by 115% between 2008 and 2019, the ratio would have increased by 75%.
Finally, at the end of 2019, the Euribor, the interbank spread and the size spread are
200, 20 and 20 bp respectively below their counterfactual path.
5 Concluding remarks
In the wake of the GFC, economic research has recalled the role played by financial
shocks in explaining business cycles. We contribute to this literature by focusing on the
euro area and expanding the typical set of variables used in macro-monetary models,
i.e. activity, investment and monetary policy rate. We complement this set with cor-
porate loans, the interbank spread, the size spread and a simple ratio of market based
finance. The two latter enable us to consider the asymmetric conditions of smaller cor-
porations, more reliant on bank loans, and the greater flexibility of larger corporates
that can issue debt to circumvent tighter access to bank credit.
In order to account for financial tensions, we estimate a financial factor extracted
from a large number of financial variables. The factor - a summary measure of finan-
cial conditions - is distilled from a number of financial price and quantity indicators
related to market prices and volatility, yields, security issuance, bank balance sheet in-
dicators and monetary aggregates. The factor is then incorporated into the BVAR model
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Notes: The Figure reports the counterfactual evolution of the macroeconomic series, had financial
conditions remained constant at their level in the second quarter of 2010 until the first quarter of
2013. Only the bank lending supply shock is assumed to adjust to ensure the new path for the
financial condition indicator. The interval bands report the interval of the 20th and 80th deciles.
See note figure 1 for the dimension of the variables.
completing the set of macroeconomic series.
We find that bank lending supply shocks, identified through impact and sign re-
strictions, had a significant influence on both real and financial developments in the
euro area in the period from 2008 to 2019. The impact of bank lending supply shocks is
especially pronounced in the shorter run for real variables. It is estimated to have been
substantial on activity, investment, size and interbank spreads, reaching a peak around
six quarters after the shock. The impact is even more persistent on corporate loans and
the ratio of market-based finance. Adverse shocks to bank lending supply are accompa-
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nied by some substitution away from bank loans into debt securities, hence an increase
in the ratio of market finance, as corporates need to circumvent bottlenecks in the bank
credit distribution. For all the variables, the responses to bank lending supply shocks
in the euro area since the beginning of 2000s are found to be stronger and somewhat
more persistent than those to demand shocks. Adverse shocks to bank lending supply
resulted in a more restricted corporate access to external finance and therefore lowered
investment.
The persistence of the impact of bank lending supply shocks relates to the super-
debt cycle hypothesis, according to which financial tensions result in a protracted pe-
riod of adjustment and repair in the financial sector. This is likely to explain part of the
sub-par-investment in Europe since the beginning of the recovery, from 2013 onwards.
The analysis also shows that to some extent, larger firms took advantage of their ac-
cess to the market to circumvent the tightened access to bank credits. Indeed, part of
the protracted increase in corporate debt to loan ratio since the crisis reflects adverse
shocks to bank lending supply. Conversely, smaller corporations, unable to issue, faced
a higher rise in borrowing costs.
Our analysis of macro-financial developments in the euro area between 2008 and
2019 suggests a strong need for policy actions to deepen corporate debt markets and
enlarge market access for smaller corporates. As euro area jurisdictions are differently
populated in terms of small enterprises, a European policy is required to promote the
convergence in conditions of access to finance. Two main strategies are feasible: al-
leviating the hurdles to primary debt issuance and leveraging on banks’ asset-backed
securities issuance. They are not exclusive, however. In this context, the ongoing work
under the umbrella of capital market 2.0 is much welcome.
References
[1] Adrian T., P. Colla, and H.S. Shin (2013), “Which financial frictions? Parsing the
evidence from the financial crisis of 2007-9”, In D. Acemoglou, J. Parker and M.
29
Woodford (Eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 27, 159-214, The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
[2] Aldasoro I. and R. Unger (2017), “External financing and economic activity in the
euro area - why are bank loans special?”, BIS Working Papers, No. 622, March.
[3] Altavilla C., M. Darracq Paries and G. Nicoletti (2019), “Loan supply, credit mar-
kets and the euro area financial crisis”, Journal of Banking Finance, vol. 109, issue
C.
[4] Banbura M., D. Giannone and L. Reichlin (2010), “Large bayesian vector auto re-
gressions”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 25, pp.71–92.
[5] Baumeister C. and L. Benati (2013), “Unconventional monetary policy and the
great recession: estimating the macroeconomic effect of a spread compression at
the zero lower bound”, International Journal of Central Banking, June 2013, pp.
165-212.
[6] Becker B. and V. Ivashina (2014), “Cyclicality of credit supply: firm-level evi-
dence”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 62, pp. 76–93.
[7] Bernanke B., M. Gertler and S. Gilchrist (1999), “The financial accelerator in a
quantitative business cycle framework”, Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1,
Chapter 21, edited by JB. Taylor and M. Woodford, Elsevier Science.
[8] Bernanke B., J. Boivin and P.S. Eliasz (2005), “Measuring the effects of mone-
tary policy: a structural interpretation: a Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive
(FAVAR) Approach”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (1), pp. 387-422.
[9] Bijsterbosch M. and M. Falagiarda (2015), “The macroeconomic impact of finan-
cial fragmentation in the euro area: Which role for credit supply?”, Journal of In-
ternational Money and Finance, Volume 54, June 2015, pp. 93-115.
[10] Blake A. and H. Mumtaz (2012), “CCBS Technical Handbook No.4. Applied
Econometrics for Central Bankers”, Bank of England.
30
[11] Borensztein E. and L.Ye (2018), “Corporate debt overhang and investment”,
World Bank Policy research working paper No. 8553.
[12] Campello M., J.R. Graham and C. Harvey (2010), “The real effects of financial
constrains: evidence from a financial crisis”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol.
97, Issue 3, pp. 470-487.
[13] Christiano L., R. Motto and M. Rostagno (2013), “Risk Shocks”, American Eco-
nomic Review, vol. 104, N1, pp. 27-65.
[14] Dave C., S. J. Dressler and L. Zhang (2013) “Bank-lending Channel: A FAVAR
Analysis” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 45, No. 8, pp. 1705-1720.
[15] De Fiore F. and H. Uhlig (2015), “Corporate Debt Structure and the Financial Cri-
sis”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 47, No. 8, pp. 1571-1598.
[16] De Graeve F. (2008), “The external finance premium and the macroeconomy: US-
post WWII evidence”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 32, pp. 3415-
3440.
[17] Duchin R., O. Ozbas and B.A. Sensoy (2010), “Costly external finance, corporate
investment, and the subprime mortgage credit crisis”, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 97, pp. 418-435.
[18] EC (2017), “Analysis of the European corporate bond market”, Analytical report
supporting the main report from the Commission Expert Group on Corporate
Bonds, November.
[19] ECB (2018), “Business investment in EU countries”, WGEM team on investment,
ECB Occasional paper No. 215, October 2018.
[20] Gambetti L. and A. Musso (2017), “Loan supply shocks and the business cycle”
Journal of Applied Economics, 32, pp.764–782.
31
[21] Garcia-Posada Gomez, M. (2019), “Credit constraints, firm investment and em-
ployment: Evidence form survey data””, Journal of Banking and Finance, pp.
99:121-141.
[22] Gertler M. and P. Karadi (2011), “A model of unconventional monetary policy”,
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 58, pp. 17-34.
[23] Gilchrist S. and E. Zakrajcek (2012),“Credit Spreads and Business Cycle Fluctua-
tions”, American Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 4, pp. 169-1720.
[24] Gilchrist S. and B. Mojon (2016), “Credit Risk in the euro area”, The Economic
Journal, 128 (February), 118–158.
[25] Holguı́n, J.S. and J.M. Uribe (2020), “The credit supply channel of monetary pol-
icy: evidence from a FAVAR model with sign restrictions”. Empirical Economics
59, pp. 2443–2472.
[26] Holm-Hadulla, F. and C. Thurwachter (2021), “Heterogeneity in corporate debt
structures and the transmission of monetary policy”. European Economic Review,
July 2021, Vol. 136.
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Appendix A 
Series included in the auxiliary dataset: description, source and transformation 
 
Variable Description Source Transformation 
 
 Banks and financial institutions  
 
Capital ratio 
Average capital ratio of the Euro area banking sector, 
defined as total capital plus reserves over total assets 
ECB BSI statistics Qtr change 
Liquidity ratio 
Average liquidity ratio of the Euro area banking sector, 
defined as securities plus cash over total assets 
ECB BSI statistics Qtr change 
M1 
Euro area aggregate stock of currency and overnight 
deposits 
ECB Qtr growth rate 
M2 – M1 Euro area monetary deposits other than overnight ECB Qtr growth rate 
M3 – M2 Marketable instruments included in Euro area M3 ECB Qtr growth rate 
Government securities Euro area MFIs holdings of government securities ECB BSI statistics Qtr growth rate 
Securities other than 
shares 
Euro area MFIs holding of securities other than shares ECB BSI statistics Qtr growth rate 
Interest rate on 
consumer loans 
Annualised lending rate on MFIs new consumer loans, 
Euro area 
ECB MIR Statistics Qtr growth rate 
Bank bond spread 
Spread Financial AA Merrill Lynch Bond Index minus 
Euribor 3-months Merrill Lynch None 
Beta Financials 
Average of the rolling 60-business day covariance of the 
daily percentage change of the euro area’s banking sector 
equity index and its overall stock market index, divided by 
the rolling 60-business day variance of the daily percentage 
change of the overall stock market index 
Based on Refinitiv  None 
Volatility financial 
stocks 
Realised volatility of stock market returns of financial 
institutions. The realised volatility is defined as the Qtr 
average of the absolute daily returns 
Based on Refinitiv None 
 
Fixed income market 
 
Gov. bond spread (2y) Euro area - German gov. bond yield (2 years) Based on Bloomberg None 
Gov. bond spread (3y) 
Difference between Euro area and German gov. bond 
yield (3 years) 
Based on Bloomberg None 
Gov. bond spread (5y) 
Difference between Euro area and German gov. bond 
yield (5 years) 
Based on Bloomberg None 
Gov. bond spread (7y) Difference between Euro area and German gov. bond 
yield (7 years) 
Based on Bloomberg None 
Gov. bond spread 
(10y) 
Difference between Euro area and German gov. bond 
yield (10 years) 
Based on Bloomberg None 
Gov. bond yield, 
volatility 
Monthly average of the absolute value of daily yield 
changes in the German benchmark 10-year gov. bond 
Based on Refinitiv None 
Corporate bond 
spread (NFCs, AA) 
Spread between the bond index for AA-NFCS and that for 
Euro area governments 




Variable Description Source Transformation 
Fixed income market (cont.) 
Corporate bond 
spread (NFCs, A) 
Spread between the bond index for A-NFCS and that for 
Euro area governments 
Based on Refinitiv 





Spread between the Bond Index for BBB-NFCS and that 
for Euro area governments 
Based on Refinitiv 
and Merrill Lynch None 
Corporate bond 
spread (FIs, AAA) 
Spread between the bond index for AAA-FIs and that for 
Euro area governments 
Based on Refinitiv 
and Merrill Lynch None 
Corporate bond 
spread (FIs, AA) 
Spread between the bond index for AA-FIs and that for 
Euro area governments 
Based on Refinitiv 
and Merrill Lynch 
None 
Corporate bond 
spread (FIs, A) 
Spread between the bond index for A-FIs and that for 
Euro area governments 
Based on Refinitiv 
and Merrill Lynch 
None 
Corporate bond 
spread (FIs, BBB) 
Spread between the Bond Index for BBB-FIs and that for 
Euro area governments 
Based on Refinitiv 
and Merrill Lynch 
None 
Spread on high 
yield 
Spread between the yield on euro-denominated corporate 
bonds with sub-investment grade category and that on 
Euro area governments 
Based on Refinitiv 




Euro area bond market Refinitiv None 
Implied stock 
market volatility 




(NFCs) Stock price index of Euro area NFCs Refinitiv Qtr growth rate 
Stock prices (FIs) Stock price index of Euro area FIs Refinitiv Qtr growth rate 
Price-to-Book 
(NFCs) 
Index of price to book value of Euro area NFCs Refinitiv None 
Price-to-Book (FIs) Index of price to book value of Euro area FIs Refinitiv None 
Equities stock 
(NFCs)  
Notional index of equity stock of Euro area NFCs ECB Qtr growth rate 
Equities stock (FIs)  Notional index of equity stock of Euro area FIs. ECB Qtr growth rate 
Stocks and Bond 
correlation 
Qtr average of the rolling 30-business day correlation 
between the daily percentage change of the euro area 
equity index (Eurostoxx) and German benchmark 
government bond yield 
Based on ECB and 
Refinitiv  None 
Volatility stocks 
NFCs 
Realised volatility of stock market return of European 
NFCs. Qtr average of absolute daily returns 
Based on Refinitiv None 
  
Variable Description Source Transformation 
 




Euro area nominal effective exchange rate vis-à-vis 12 
trading partners ECB Qtr growth rate 
Euro, nominal 
effective exchange 
rate (volatility)  
Realised volatility of nominal effective exchange rate of the 
euro vis-à-vis 12 trading partners. Qtr average of absolute 
daily return 
Based on ECB None 
World market 
price of raw 
materials 
Index of Cost of imported raw material in the industrial 
countries (euro area and OECD countries, in euros) 
HWWI  Qtr growth rate 
Oil Price WTI index in euros HWWI  Qtr growth rate 
Policy uncertainty 
Index of EU policy uncertainty; see “Measuring Economic 
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